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A MODEST REPLICATION TO A LENGTHY DISCOURSE *
MoRms S. ARNoLD
Having had before me for some time the frightening example
made of Richard Mylward, I shall keep my replication (as the old
lawyers would have called it) extremely brief. The story goes that
the hapless Mylward so angered Ellesmere by drafting a replication
of 120 pages that he was arrested, brought into Westminster Hall,
and paraded before the courts with his head stuck through his draft
and the papers hanging "'about his shoulders, with the written side
outward.' "1 The tale is useful not only as an inducement to
brevity, but also as a reminder of the extraordinarily implacable
and disagreeable personality of the man upon whose alleged views
the reader has just been asked to place principal reliance.2
Contrary to the clear implication of Mr. Campbell's part of
the Discussion piece, I nowhere indicated that a special regard for
trial by jury was the sole reason for opposition to equity courts in
colonial America. Indeed, I very carefully cknowledged that there
were other reasons for that opposition, and contended simply that
affection for jury trials was one significant source.3 Nor did I assert
that most American jurisdictions never had separate equity courts.
In fact, I specifically admitted that many jurisdictions did, but
noted that in a good many of them trial by jury was a regular
feature.4 Since I wrote the original piece, further research has
* See Campbell & Le Poidevin, Complex Cases and Jury Trials: A Reply to
Professor Arnold, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 965 (1980).
I have modeled the title for my response on David Dudley Field's pithy
rejoinder to his critics, which Professor Stephen B. Burbank kindly brought to my
attention. See D. FrEuD, A SHoRT RESPONsE TO A LONG DiscoursE (1884).
1 The story is a very familiar one. A brief account can be found in 5
W. HornswoRs, A I-hsToRy OF ENGLiSm LAw 233 & n.7 (3d ed. 1945) (quoting
Mylward v. Weldon (Ch. 1596), in C. Momo, AcTA CANcELLArAE 692, 693
(London 1847)).
2 See Campbell & Le Poidevin, Complex Cases and Jury Trials: A Reply to
Professor Arnold, 128 U. PA. L. Rev. 965 (1980).
3 Arnold, A Historical Inquiry into the Right to Trial by Jury in Complex Civil
Litigation, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 829, 832 (1980).
4 Arnold, supra note 3, at 835-38. Mr. Campbell states that juries were used in
England in the course of equity suits. Campbell & Le Poidevin, supra note 2, at
968 n.14. That is true, and far from denying it, I stated that that was the
case. Arnold, supra note 3, at 836-37. But I maintain that the use of juries was
more extensive in this country and that jury verdicts were in many places con-
sidered binding. By contrast, in English equity practice references of facts to
juries "were for the convenience and at the discretion of the Chancellor," and jury
verdicts were not binding on him. Langbein, Fact Finding in the English Court
of Chancery: A Rebuttal, 83 YALE LJ. 1620, 1624 (1974).
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disclosed that colonial Delaware also had a statute requiring a jury
trial of all matters of fact arising in its equity courts.5 Obviously,
my point in focusing on these practices was not that the Constitu-
tion requires equitable suits to be tried by jury today; the seventh
amendment applies to suits at common law. The fact the framers
did not require juries in equity is thus completely irrelevant to my
point.6 Rather, these practices are significant because they establish
even more firmly that eighteenth-century Americans had a special
attachment to the jury.
It does not seem to me to be very radical to suggest that, in
deciding the scope and correct meaning of the seventh amendment,
this high regard for trial by jury be given great weight. In par-
ticular, I believe this reverence for jury trial indicates that colonial
Americans were not so distrustful of juries as to allow equity to
take jurisdiction from law on the ground of a so-called "com-
plexity." Indeed, this attitude explains why those who take the
side against me are unable to cite a single American case demon-
strating such an equitable power.
Mr. Le Poidevin chides me for ignoring certain relevant
eighteenth-century cases and concentrating my efforts on two more
ancient ones. I did that because the other cases are all actions of
account and, as I indicated, I believe that their appearance in equity
in the first place was due to the superior process available there.
Moreover, what made the old action of account cumbersome had
nothing to do with the practical limitations of jurors but rather
with the inconvenience of putting a large number of questions to
them. These precedents simply do not reveal a generalized equi-
table jurisdiction over "complex" cases.
Mr. Le Poidevin offers an alternative analysis of Towneley v.
Clench, and prefers to see the decision there as turning on a diffi-
culty involving the Statute of Uses and the Statute of Wills. His
I stand by all the statements in my Article regarding the nature and extent of
equitable jurisdiction in eighteenth-century Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, and
invite the reader to examine the authorities which Mr. Campbell cites in opposition
to my account. See Campbell & Le Poidevin, supra note 2, at 967-70.
5An Act for the establishing Courts of Law and Equity within this Government,
in LAWS OF THE GOVERNMENT oF NEw-CAsTLE, KENT AND SussEx UPON DEImAwA m
39, 48 (Philadelphia 1741), reprinted in THE EAmmsT PRNTED LAws oF
DELAwAm 1704-1741, at 47, 56 (1978).
6 Mr. Campbell wonders why I made no reference to the debates surrounding
the adoption of the seventh amendment. The reason is that those debates are
inconclusive and reveal at the very most some lack of enthusiasm for constitutionally
compelling jury trial in equity causes. If there had been any real aversion to
employing juries in equity one would think that their use there would have been
forbidden. But it cannot be successfully contended that the seventh amendment
prohibits such a procedure.
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analysis ignores the fact that the judgment in the case wholly omits
any reference to this alleged difficulty. It is true, as Mr. Le Poidevin
notes, that there was no requirement that judgments set forth their
reasons. But the judgment in Clench in fact advances reasons in
support of the decree, and those reasons do not at all relate to the
supposed complexity of the case. The judgment proceeds instead on
the assumption that the defendant was still withholding the plain-
tiff's evidence, thus disabling him from vindicating his rights at
law. As Mr. Le Poidevin admits, no legal action was available to
the plaintiff for recovering his deeds. Does it not seem clear that
this was the basis for enjoining the defendant's legal action? But
much more fundamentally, even if Ellesmere made the statement
attributed to him, and even if Mr. Le Poidevin's analysis correctly
explains it, the case remains unique and without either precedent
or progeny. It never was a basis for denying a jury to a plaintiff
that complicated matters of law might arise in the course of a trial.7
Finally, Mr. Le Poidevin seems to think that my entire argu-
ment is somehow exploded if equity had concurrent jurisdiction
over complex cases." That is not true, for the plaintiff is the master
of his cause of action; once it is characterized as legal by him, the
ordinary attributes of a trial of law, including the availability of a
jury, necessarily follow.9
7 Mr. Le Poidevin insists I have admitted that in Blad v. Bamjield, a jury was
stopped from hearing a case because it was "complex." Campbell & Le Poidevin,
supra note 2, at 974 n.48. I make no such admission, as the reader is invited
to discover for himself.
8 See Campbell & Le Poidevin, supra note 2, at 974 n.45.
9 See generally F. J.Mrs & G. HAzAnD, Crarv PRocE:DuE 370-73 (2d ed.
1977); 1 J. PomBEoy, A TREATiSE oN EQUITY JURISPRUDENcE § 179, at 251-52
(5th ed. 1941); James, Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655,
671-73 (1963).
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